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WATER
FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SINCE

PLLRC

By FRANK J. TRELEASE*
INTRODUCTION

Cyprinodon diabolis, The Devil's Hole pupfish, is alive and
well and living in a striated marble palace in Nevada, located
within a small addition to the Death Valley National Monument
created for his benefit in 1952. "Zippy" is an insignificant little
creature, about three-fourths of an inch long, who inhabits one of
the remnants of the lake that once filled Death Valley. In Pleistocene times, the lake receded and left Zippy behind in a pool of
water in the mouth of a limestone cavern. Other pupfish live in
the few springs and tiny streams running in the valley, but in the
course of 20,000 years diabolis has come to differ from his cousins
many times removed, much as the finches Darwin found on the
Galapagos Islands differ from their South American counterparts. The pool in Devil's Hole contains a submerged sloping rock
shelf, which, for reasons best known to the pupfish, is the only
place suitable for spawning and propagation of their race. In 1966
the Cappaerts, the owners of a nearby large ranch, drilled wells
into the underground formation that supplies or supports the pool
and began to pump water from it to irrigate bermuda grass, alfalfa, wheat, and barley. By 1970 the lowering water threatened
to expose the rock shelf where the pupfish reproduce and thus to
exterminate the last bearers of Cyprinodon diabolis genes.
Zippy has always had friends in high places. Dr. Robert Rush
Miller, curator of fishes at the University of Michigan, and Dr.
Carl L. Hubbs of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography were
instigators of the movement to add the pupfish's home to the
monument.' The National Park Service, the Department of the
Interior, and former President Harry Truman were swayed by
their efforts. In the now famous case of Cappaert v. United
States,' the full weight of the federal judiciary was thrown in on
the side of the insignificant pupfish. The United States Attorney,

2

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
Trusso, Big Trouble for a Tiny Fish, 3 SMrrHsoNAN 48 (1972).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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the Chief Judge of the United States District Court of Nevada,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court of the United States all rallied to the rescue, and the Cappaerts, the Nevada State Engineer, and the Attorney General of
the State of Nevada were routed. The pumping was enjoined; the
pupfish were saved.
The pupfish had not only a reservation of the land surrounding Devil's Hole but also a federal reserved water right for the pool
within the Hole. The federal reserved water right is alive and well
too. It is very like the Devil's Hole pupfish in many ways. It too
is an evolutionary sport. It too lives in Devil's Hole. It too has
friends in high places within the federal bureaucracy and judicial
system.
The federal reserved water right is not like other water rights,
at least not like those in the West. It is not on record, not fixed
in size, not dependent on beneficial use. When the Federal Government withdraws a part of its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government by implication
reserves enough of the "appurtenant" 3 unappropriated water to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. The water right may
lie dormant for years, and in the meantime the water may have
been put to use by people who have invested funds and effort to
build water-dependent enterprises. Under the doctrine of prior
appropriation their water rights would be safe from others who
might seek to take the water, since the priorities of the latter
would be later and inferior. But the rights are not safe from the
United States. If the Government eventually exercises its reserved right, its priority relates not to the date of use but to that
date, long past, when the reservation was created. When the government takes the water, therefore, the investment and the enterprise of the private water user go down the drain.
Or do they? This is the theory and the prediction. But in the
twenty-one years since the federal reserved water right was invented, or discovered, by the Supreme Court, this has not yet
happened. I am beginning to wonder if the comparison to the
measly pupfish cannot be carried through-if the federal reserved
No case defines or explains this word. It probably means "located" or "bordering
on," possibly "underlying," possibly "nearby."
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water right is also insignificant and worthless. At one time the
federal reserved right was thought to be more like the great white
shark of "Jaws." Reserved rights were seen "as a first mortgage
of undetermined and indeterminable magnitude," as a "sword of
Damocles" hanging over "every title to water rights to every
stream which touches a federal reservation." ' Inspired Senators
and Congressmen rallied to the rescue. Over fifty bills were introduced to neutralize the rights-and nothing happened.' Nothing
happened in Congress, and nothing happened to water users in
the West.

I.

ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE

Although it is now fashionable to say that the first precedents
for the reserved doctrine were the dicta contained in the 1899
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.' case and the 1908
Winters v. United States7 Indian case, can testify that no one
regarded these as such prior to Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon' (Pelton Dam) in 1955.
I was there. I took a course in water law in 1938 and got an
A in it. I then went to work for L. Ward Bannister, one of the
negotiators of the Colorado River Compact and lecturer in water
law at Denver University and Harvard University. I helped to
bring his notes up to date. I listened in on discourses he had with
Ralph Carr, Jean Breitenstein, John Reed, and other "irrigation
lawyers" of the old school. I started to teach water law in 1946,
and I was General Counsel for the Missouri River Basin Survey
Commission in 1952. At no time prior to 1955 did I ever hear a
suggestion that the reserved rights doctrine was anything but a
special quirk of Indian water law.
True, there was a notion lurking in the background that since
the United States originally "owned" the water in the West, as
Address by Northcutt Ely to National Water Commission (Nov. 6, 1969).
See Morreale, Federal State Conflicts over Western Waters-a Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUT. L. REv. 423 (1966).
' 174 U.S. 690 (1899). "[A] state cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters, so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property." Id.at 703.
7 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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it owned the land of the public domain, it might still be the
"owner" of unappropriated water This theory was advanced by
Attorneys General for the United States in a couple of interstate
cases, but it was seemingly rejected in Kansas v. Colorado'" and
was held inapplicable in Nebraska v. Wyoming." In the latter
case the waters of the North Platte were being divided between
the states and the Government asked, on the strength of this
theory, that a separate allocation of water be made to the United
States for its irrigation projects. That argument the Supreme
Court put aside, on the basis that under the Reclamation Act'"
the Government acquired its water rights through the state and
the states therefore stood in judgment for the United States.'
Earlier, in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.," a suit between private parties, the Supreme Court, on
what now seems to be a spurious reading of the Desert Land Act,'5
held that the Act
effected a severance of all water on the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself. . . . Congress intended to
establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented
separately; and that all nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and
territories . . ..

So the western water lawyer, though he may have had some nagging fear in the back of his mind that the United States might
have constitutional power to use water without complying with
state law, or even power to regulate its use, nevertheless felt quite
safe behind the twin shields of the Reclamation Act'7 and the
Desert Land Act.'"
The safety thought provided by the Acts was weakened by
See Bannister, The Question of FederalDispositionof State Waters in the Priority
States, 28 I-hay. L. REv. 270 (1915); Carpenter, Conflict of JurisdictionRespecting Control

of Waters in Western States, 2 RocKy MTN. L. REv. 162 (1929).
10206 U.S. 46 (1907).
1 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
37 6 6
12 43 U.S.C. §§
1- 1 yyy (1970).
325 U.S. at 629-30.
295 U.S. 142 (1935).
,5 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-399 (1970). See F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
LAW, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY No. 5, at 147a-m (1971).
, 295 U.S. at 162.
17
"

See note 15 supra.
See note 12 supra.

IN WATER

1977

WA TER

the Supreme Court's Pelton Dam decision in 1955.'1 The Pelton
Dam case did not involve water rights as such. All it held was that
a license from the United States to build a dam on reserved lands
could not be thwarted by lack of state permission. 0 But the language of both the majority and the dissent is susceptible of being
construed as saying that the Desert Land Act's severance of the
water from the public lands did not apply to reserved lands,
which, therefore, still have water attached to them.' It is generally assumed that the power company is now exercising, by some
implied assignment, the right of the United States to use the
water which it reserved from the jurisdiction of the State of Oregon when it reserved the power site. 2 This was even worse than
"ownership of unappropriated water;" it was ownership of
appropriatedwater, if the appropriation had been made subsequent to the reservation.
This case was a real bombshell, and it certainly lit a fire
under western water lawyers.23 Senator Barrett of Wyoming
rushed into Congress with the first of what was to be a long series
of "Western Water Rights Settlement Acts," 4 and a number of
western state water officials and others raised a chorus of protest
at this reversal of what they had always thought to be the law.25
The fire was fueled by an even more direct holding that the
United States need not comply with state water appropriation
statutes .2 A federal district court directly held that the commandant of the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot need not file
See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
349 U.S. at 443-45. Stripped of dicta, the case does no more than assert federal
supremacy, a slight modification of the rule of First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Power Coop. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
1,349 U.S. at 447-48, 455-56.
2 Carver, The Implied Reservation Doctrine:Policy on Law, 6 LAN & WATER L. REV.
117 (1970); Corker, Let There Be No Nagging Doubts: Nor Shall PrivateProperty, Including Water Rights, Be Taken for Public Use without Just Compensation, 6 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 109 (1970).
z Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill
of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 604 (1957); Martz, The Role of the FederalGovernment in State
Water Law, 5 KN. L. REv. 626 (1957); Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?
36 ORE. L. REv. 221 (1957).
J 5. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
The most detailed treatment is Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western
Waters-a Decade of "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuT. L. REv. 423 (1966).
0 Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds,
279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
"
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proofs of completion of wells used on that modern adaptation of
an old military reservation. The Navy had originally filed for and
received permits for the wells but, after Pelton Dam, refused to
complete the state procedures. The court fanned the flames with
the harshest statement yet of federal supremacy and rejection of
state control: That the United States could not be compelled "to
bend its knee to . . .state law and regulation"27 that might
impede its use of its own property for national defense purposes.
About this time the first stirrings of the environmental movement were felt, and the conservationists saw federal reserved
rights as an escape from utilitarian state laws that emphasized
the diversion and damming of streams. Even the Department of
Justice and federal agencies began to look upon the mildest protection of private rights as possibly nullifying existing federal uses
and frustrating federal programs and purposes." So although
many modified successors to the Barrett Bill2 9 were introduced in
the next ten to fifteen years, they lost rather than gained support
as the opposition of these two groups coalesced. Meanwhile the
misreading of the Pelton Dam case, or its misreading of the Desert Land Act,30 came to fruition in Arizona v. California.31 The
chimera became a dragon: Reserved rights for non-Indian federal
lands were declared to exist in real life; indeed, they were not only
identified but quantified. The Havasu Lake National Wildlife
Refuge was allowed a diversion of 41,839 acre-feet per year to feed
its consumptive need for 37,339 acre-feet, and the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge was allowed to divert 28,000 acre-feet and
consume 23,000 acre-feet, all with 1941 priorities.
I. THE PLLRC AND BEYOND
The following year the Public Land Law Review Commission 32 (PLLRC) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the public lands of the United States and the laws, polirl

165 F. Supp. at 601.

2 F. TRELEASE, supra

note 15, at 145.

See note 24 supra.
" See C. WHEATLEY & C. CORKER, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND USE
OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBuC LANDS (Prepared for the Public Land Law Review
Commission) 106-12 (1969).
' 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
12 The authorization for the PLLRC and the guidelines for its operation are found at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970).
2
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cies, and practices relating thereto. The development, management, and use of water resources on the public lands was seen as
a part of this assignment, and what has been known as the
Wheatley-Corker Study 3 was commissioned. That study's thorough, in-depth analysis of the reserved rights doctrine and the
reception and treatment given it by the agencies were supposed
to be nonpartisan and dispassionate. Indeed it was, on the surface, yet it left not a shred of respectability to the doctrine. The
Commission, however, put aside academic arguments and lingering doubts, saying they were laid to rest by Arizona v. California,
and urged legislative action to dispel the uncertainties produced
by the doctrine. The Commission recommended: First, a quantification by the agencies of their water requirements for the next
40 years; second, a procedure for administrative or judicial determination of the reasonableness and validity of the agency claims;
third, a requirement that future withdrawals of land carry no
water rights without an express reservation of unappropriated
water; and last, but not least, a provision for compensation whenever a use under an implied reserved right interfered with a state
law water right vested prior to the decision in Arizona v.
California.3 The Commission put its recommendation for compensation squarely on the basis of fairness by recognizing that
''prior to the Supreme Court's decision . . . no water user could
have been on actual or constructive notice of the existence of such
an 'implied' Federal water right." 5
The Commission's first two recommendations ignored the
possibility explored in the Wheatley-Corker report: That federal
implied reserved water rights might be identified and quantified
by state courts and agencies in general adjudication proceedings
along with everyone else's water rights. The federal agencies ignored the Commission's recommendation that they identify and
quantify their own needs. When a Colorado water user summoned
the United States into a Colorado state adjudication case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court in and for
the County of Eagle acquired jurisdiction under the McCarran
3

See note 30 supra.
PuBuc LAND LAW REVIEW

(1970).
1 Id. at 149.

COMMISSION,

ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND

141-49
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Amendment,"6 by which the United States had consented to be
sued in suits for the adjudication of water rights when it was the
owner of water rights acquired by appropriation under state law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise.37 This listing, said Mr.
Justice Douglas, had no exceptions and included reserved rights.
Questions of the validity and scope of reserved rights might be
questions of federal law, but they were questions which might be
decided by a state court, subject to review by the Supreme Court
38
of the United States.
By this time the National Water Commission 39 had been created, and the question of reserved water rights was made a part
of a legal study relating to federal-state relations in water law.4 I
tried in that study to add an economic dimension to the discussion. I pointed out, to my complete satisfaction, that it was nonsense to treasure the doctrine as a source of power, as the Justice
Department and the conservation groups were doing, since the
United States had ample constitutional and statutory powers to
take and use water for all its projects and programs, free from
state interference. The only question, I tried to say, was whether
the United States should pay for water it took from its former
users. If it exercised federal power in the usual way, it would
compensate the water user for his loss, but, if the new found
"implied reservation doctrine" was used, the United States could
take the water without paying for it. My first recommendation
was for a National Water Resources Procedures Act, a procedural
approach which would have combined the features of Eagle
County and section 383 of the Reclamation Act 4 and applied
them to all federal uses: The Federal Government should proceed
in conformity with state law when making any use of water and
follow state permit or court procedures when initiating or perfecting water rights. In other words, it should act as it had thousands
of times in the past when obtaining water for national parks,
forests, reclamation projects, and BLM lands. Conformity to
state procedures did not mean compliance with substantive law,
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
Id. at 526.
42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. IV 1974).
,0F. TRtLEASE, supra note 15.
"1483 U.S.C. §§ 371-616yyy (1970).
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however. Federal supremacy was preserved and state law could
not block a federal project or action authorized by a constitutional congressional statute. The national agency might proceed
despite the state law, using such state forms and formalities as it
deemed desirable to 42give the states notice of the type and amount
of the federal claim.
To this suggestion for procedural comity was added a recommendation for abolition of the no-compensation feature of the
reserved right. The argument of the National Water Commission
(NWC) was quite different from that of the Public Land Law
Review Commission. The main theme of the NWC was that water
law should be put on a sound property basis, that a sensible
system of water rights would not include a bunch of wild cards
in the deck, cards that could be played at any time as trumps to
upset the expectations of water users. The doctrine should be
abandoned, not simply on the fairness rationale argued by the
PLLRC but because of its economic unsoundness, legal fallacies,
and planning incompatibilities. 3
The most that can be said for my efforts is that they dispelled
the myth that reserved rights were a source of federal power and
a valuable conservation tool that gave freedom from state control.
The Department of Justice abandoned its claim to this effect and
came to treat reserved rights simply as valuable property rights
of the Government, valuable because they would save a few dollars of water costs for some federal water uses.
As a result of Eagle County, the federal agencies found themselves in state adjudication proceedings in New Mexico, Utah,
and Idaho, as well as in several other Colorado courts. The Department of Justice felt that these valuable rights should not be
left to unsympathetic state courts and administrators, but should
be protected by the federal courts, and attempted an end run
around Eagle County. The United States had been joined in the
state proceedings in northwestern Colorado but not in southwestern Colorado. Federal lawyers rushed into the federal district
court in Denver and filed a suit to adjudicate all federal reserved
rights from the San Juan River and its tributaries for national
"

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE

, Id. at 464-68.

FuTuR 459-63 (1973).
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parks, monuments, and forests; rights held on behalf of a couple
of Indian tribes; and some state law rights held for these purposes
and for reclamation projects. Over a thousand water users were
made defendants, the list being headed by Mary Akin, who enjoyed in some measure the advantage held by Abou ben Adam.
The United States district judge first held that he had jurisdiction over the case, as one arising under federal law, but then
dismissed it on the theory that he should abstain from deciding
it since important problems of state law were involved. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that abstention
was inappropriate."
While Akin was in this posture, the Secretary of the Interior,
as Chairman of the United States Water Resources Council,
asked the Department of Justice for its opinion on the National
Water Commission's recommendations and for an alternative
suggestion for a statute. What has come to be known as the Keichel Bill4 5 was drafted, along with a supporting statement." It
would require the head of each water using agency of the United
States to prepare an inventory of all the agency's water rights,
both reserved and appropriated, under procedures established by
the Secretary of the Interior and under statutory guidelines for
quantification. The Secretary would maintain a national inventory of these rights and would inform the states of the water rights
claimed in each. State water officials, or a water user claiming an
injury, might then bring an action for judicial review in the federal courts. Curiously, this was not proposed as an exclusive remedy. State adjudications might still be brought under the McCarran Amendment, and the "race to the courthouse" might proceed.
The supporting statement, except for an erroneous assertion
that the National Water Commission sought state control over
federal activity by its "conformity" recommendation, explained
the bill as a straightforward assertion of federal property rights.
Quantification in this manner was said to be a fulfillment of the
" United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).

U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Proposed Bill to Provide for the Inventorying and Quantification of the Reserved, Appropriative and Other Rights to the Use of Water by the United
States (June 20, 1974 draft).
" Id. Supporting statement at 7-9.
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PLLRC's request, and, as for compensation, it was said that this
might follow the quantification once the United States knew how
much people might be hurt and how much it might be giving
away. This bill was never approved by the United States Water
Resources Council or introduced into Congress. It now rests in the
same limbo that holds the PLLRC and National Water Commission recommendations.
Next came the reversal of Akin. Mrs. Akin lost her alphabetical advantage because she didn't have funds to finance an appeal,
and the case became the polysyllabic Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.' First the Supreme Court
ruled that the United States district courts did indeed have jurisdiction over an adjudication brought by the Federal Government,
that the McCarran Amendment gave concurrent but not exclusive jurisdiction to the state court."
Turning to the question of abstention, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals' holding that abstention was not proper, that
there were no "difficult questions of state law," and that federal
adjudications would not disrupt an important state policy. Then,
astonishingly, the Court dismissed the case on another ground.
After the federal action was begun, the United States had been
served with process to make it a party in continuing adjudication
proceedings going on in the Colorado Water Court for Water Division 7. It was already in court in Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6. The
matter was one of concurrent jurisdiction, said the Court, and, to
avoid duplication, to carry out the policy of the McCarran
Amendment, and to prevent the piecemeal adjudication of water
rights from the same source in different courts, the federal courts
should give way.50 The case was bolstered by considerations of
forum non conviens (the federal court in Denver was 300 miles
from the river), the fact that no action had yet been taken by the
federal court, and the adequacy of the state court as a forum for
the federal claims, as attested by the Government's participation
in the other state adjudications.
- 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
" Id. at 808-09.
' Id. at 813-17.
Id. at 817-21.
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This brings us finally back to the pupfish case, decided June
7, 1976. Although the Eagle County and Colorado River District
cases had been occasions for restatement of the reserved rights
doctrine, Cappaert v. United States' added some meager substantive clues to the doctrine. To some extent the Court reduced
most of what it said to dicta. It pointed out that the proclamation
setting aside the reservation proclaims that, "WHEREAS the
said pool is of such outstanding scientific importance that it
should be given special protection,"" and said that the water
right reserved was therefore explicit, not implied. 53 However, the
Court went on to give rules for implied reservations and to apply
its statements to the reservation before it, as if it were an implied
one.
I have been told that the Cappaerts, the Nevada water authorities, and their many states' rights friends fought the case to
the death because it was the first case of substantial harm done
by enforcement of a federal water right, and would, therefore,
show the inequitable nature of such rights, and because they
sought a ruling that groundwater hidden beneath the earth could
not be the subject of a reserved right because its presence was
unknown and there could have been no intention to preserve it.
Both arguments were foredoomed.
The "inequitable" argument had always been based on the
following assumed sequence: (1) A reservation was founded, say,
in 1900; (2) in 1950, while the reserved water right lay dormant
and unknown, an appropriator put the water to a valuable and
beneficial use at a considerable cost; (3) the existence of the
reserved right was discovered in 1955 or 1963 to the horror of all
good water users and state governments; and (4) in 1970 the
Government exercised its rights, and the appropriator was
stripped of his water and shorn of his investment without any
claim for compensation. But in the Cappaert case the sequence
is reversed. The reservation was made in 1952, and the water was
then used by the United States to maintain the lineage of its
wards, the pupfish. It was the Cappaerts who in 1970 threatened
"
52

426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 140.
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to disturb the status quo and interfere with the prior right and
prior use of the United States.
The Court finally placed federal reserved rights on a property
basis.54 The Cappaerts and the State of Nevada paraded out the
old, hackneyed argument that the Desert Land Act "severed the
water from the land" and subjected it to state law. The Court
took the bait and said that Pelton Dam was the answer, that the
Desert Land Act does not apply to reserved land. "Federal water
rights are not dependent upon state law or state procedures," 56
said the Court, the Cappaerts' patents were "'subject to any
vested and accrued water rights,' " including the Government's
prior reserved rights. While their vested water rights were protected from later federal encroachment, the Cappaerts had no
water rights in 1952.58 The Court did not stress the fact that the
Cappaerts' rights post-dated not only the federal reservation but
also the federal use. This was the real answer, as the Cappaerts
would have been entitled to no compensation even if the recommendations of the PLLRC and the National Water Commission
had been law.
The groundwater argument fared no better. In one sense the
Court ducked it. The reserved water, said the Court, was the pool
in the cavern, and the pool was surface water. True, it was connected to groundwater, and the Court said: "We hold that the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion,
whether the diversion of surface or groundwater."59
The pupfish case shed some light on other troublesome issues. One is intent. In Arizona v. California the Court had said:
"[TIhe United States [who is he?] intended [how? with
what?] to reserve water sufficient for the future requirements
60 In Cappaert the Court repeated the standard formula:
....
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether

F.

Prior to Cappaert,the Court had spoken of federal powers, not property rights. See
note 15, at 147j-1.

TRELEASE, supra

426 U.S. at 144.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 140 n.5.
SId.
Id. at 143.
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the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters
are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation
was created."

But in its preliminary recital of the implied reservation of water
rights doctrine, the Court found no need to speak of intent,
whether implied, expressed, or fictional:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the
purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a
reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of
the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators."2

Three other aspects of the case should be noted. First, a
water level is maintained, giving some precedent for instream
flows. Second, the Court reiterated the rule that
[tlhe implied reservation of water doctrine . . . reserves only that
amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,
no more . . . . The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the
intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to
preserve its scientific interest . . . . Thus, as the District Court has
correctly determined, the level of the pool may be permitted to drop
to the extent that the drop does not impair the scientific value of
the pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be preserved."

This too has significance for those claims of the United States
that stream flows may be reserved for instream uses. Such flows
will be the minimum needed to preserve the features of the reservation, not full natural flows. Of course, there may be reservations whose purposes could demand a full natural flow, but there
is some comfort in the recognition that others may share in the
reserved waters, that the reserved right is not a complete dog-in373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
*1426 U.S. at 139.
2 Id. at 138. Compare with Personal Communication, February 17, 1977, from Michael D. White, Esq., of Denver, Colorado, sometime master-referee, "Seven Courts
Case," infra note 66 (stating that "[t]he reservation doctrine is a device invented by the
Court to remedy an oversight of the federal executive and legislative branches in failing
to save or provide a method of saving water for federal purposes").
13426 U.S. at 141.
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the-manger doctrine."4 Finally, the pool on the reservation was
protected by reducing withdrawals from its off-reservation
sources, again significant for instream flows. Such flows could be
reserved not only in streams arising on the federal land but also
in those flowing into the reservation or into and then out of a
private enclave within a reservation. 5
III. QUANTIFICATION-AT LAST
Following the remand of Eagle County, the United States
filed its claims for reserved rights in that case and in several
additional adjudication proceedings pending in other Colorado
courts. These proceedings were consolidated into the "Seven
Courts Case," 6 and all federal claims were referred to a single
master-referee. The litigation covered five river basins, and reserved water rights were claimed for seven national forests, one
national park, three national monuments, fifteen hundred
springs and waterholes, two mineral hot springs and two naval oil
shale reserves. The report of the master-referee contains more
than a thousand pages. It is three inches thick and weighs five
and one-half pounds. It contains not only the typical findings of
fact and conclusions of law but an excellent treatment of the law
of reserved rights as well. Some of the conclusions reached seem
more certain to the master-referee than to me; but he was ruling,
not speculating or analyzing, and his positiveness is suited to his
task.
It appears to me that this mountainous labor has brought
forth a rather small mouse. In all of the northwestern third of the
State of Colorado, the current uses by forests and parks add up
to only 12.981 cubic feet per second of stream flow and 2044.2
acre-feet of stored water. 7 The water rights for these uses cause
no problems; they coexist with existing private uses. The possible
and probable future uses are those which supposedly cause the
" Furthermore, the Court equated Indian reservations with "other federal enclaves."
Id. at 138. This may have significance when the Court comes around to deciding Indian
claims to aboriginal ownership of streams.
" In several Indian cases, upstream diversions could be curtailed to permit Indian
uses of waters flowing past the reservation. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
" M. White, Partial Master-Referee Report Governing All of the Claims of the United
States of America In and For the State of Colorado (1976).
11Id. at 15.
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concern over reserved rights. Conditional decrees for these future
uses show that they may eventually total 35.963 cubic feet per
second and 6352.39 acre-feet of impounded water. Out on the
range land the reserved springs and waterholes are found to have
a total flow of 15.39 cubic feet per second and impoundments of
7,223 acre-feet. 8 Not all of this is reserved. These amounts are
subject to reduction when evidence is submitted to show the precise amount of water reasonably necessary to fulfill the needs of
graziers who use the water-holes. These reserved waters are de
minimis; they represent no water at all compared to the total flow
of five rivers. It is true that these amounts do not include the
minimum flows and levels for streams and lakes in the parks and
forests. Evidence on these was postponed, and they will eventually be fixed at some future date prior to 1981. In the forests,
however, these recreational, fish and wildlife reservations will
have such a late priority as not to constitute a threat to current
uses, if the master-referee's ruling on the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 19609 holds up. In his opinion, the Creative Act of 189110 established the forest reserves for the purposes
of watershed protection and production of timber. The Organic
Act of 1897" expanded the description of these purposes but
added nothing to them. The opinion reasoned that although the
forests may have been used from the beginning for hunting, fishing, recreation, camping, and cattle range these were uses, not the
purposes for which the forests were established. Not until the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 were "outdoor recreation" and "wildlife and fish" stated as statutory purposes for
which the forests were maintained." If this reasoning holds (and
the master-referee presented a convincing case), then the priority
date of instream flows for these purposes is June 12, 1960, long
after most diversions and impoundments within the forests were
made. Minimum flows will be superior to uses initiated after that
date, and might interfere with some future uses high up in the
headwaters, but this is not a total loss to private uses, since the
reservations will preserve and pass down the flows for use below
PId.
19 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
70 Id.
7

7

§ 471.

Id. § 475.
See note 69 supra.
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the forest boundaries.7 3 Although most western streams are
formed on the national forests and run down from them, some
streams run into them, and some leave them, flow through a
private enclave, and then back into the forests. Post-1960 appropriations of these waters, on private lands before they enter or
reenter forests, could be reduced by the forests' need for minimum flows.
But even these effects will not be felt if another ruling of the
master-referee holds up. One section of the 1897 Organic Act is
now 16 U.S.C. § 481: "All waters within the boundaries of national forests may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the State wherein such national
forests are situated, or under the laws of the United States and
the rules and regulations established thereunder."7 4 This, said the
master-referee, subordinates all of the United States' reserved
rights on national forests to Colorado water rights for domestic,
mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, whether such rights bear
priority dates before or after the date of the reservation of the
waters appurtenant to the forests.
Another court has made a ruling quite inconsistent with
these Colorado conclusions. An Idaho trial court, adjudicating a
"minimum flow" for fishing, fire protection, and esthetic purposes on a forest established in 1907, gave the flow a 1907 priority
date and quantified it as the full natural flow of the stream, in
order to preserve the forest in its original condition." If carried
to extremes, this ruling would mean that all ditches in the national forests would have to be closed, all reservoirs emptied. I do
not believe that this can be sustained. 16 U.S.C. § 481 may not
be as far-reaching as the Colorado master-referee found it, but at
least it indicates that private uses can be made within the forests.
Furthermore, it seems very difficult to find an intent in 1891,
1897, or even 1960 to preserve the national forests in their pristine
"' The continental divide runs north and south through Colorado, dividing not only
the water of the state but the people of the state. The effect noted above may make the
people of Denver very unhappy, since they may be unable to capture some water at
elevations high enough to make transdivide diversions feasible, but this may be offset by
a corresponding happiness of the people of the western slope.
16 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
'5 Soderman v. Kackley, No. 1829 (Dist. Ct., Caribou County, Idaho, Jan. 8, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 12482 (Idaho Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1975).
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condition as parks or wilderness areas. Not even the Devil's Hole
pupfish is entitled to the maintenance of the natural conditions
which existed at the time of the creation of his preserve in 1952.
The Supreme Court in Cappaertexplicitly stated:
The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to preserve its
scientific interest . . . . Thus, . . . the level of the pool may be
permitted to drop to the extent that the drop does not impair the
scientific value of the pool as the natural habitat of the species
sought to be preserved."6

Applying this rule to the national forests, it hardly seems possible
that the Government could assert an intention to reserve full
flows when its officers soon issued use permits for such ditches
and dams and permitted uses to so impair the streams for forest
purposes as to require a rollback of uses to restore as "necessary"
that which has been foregone for many years.
Minimum flows for park purposes may be more likely, but
they do not seem to create a very large problem in Colorado."
Rocky Mountain National Park is on the headwaters. But one
substantial claim to instream flows in the Yampa River for Dinosaur National Monument could, if sustained, create problems for
upstream energy companies which have conditional decrees for
water for coal development.
The master-referee's report does not touch the largest possible federal reserved right, that for development of the Naval Oil
Shale Reserve. A claim for 200,000 acre-feet-a tidy bit of
water-was submitted. No evidence was submitted on this claim,
however, and at a pretrial conference the claim was simply put
aside, and the master-referee has now referred it back to the
court. It, therefore, remains as a bug-a-boo. But gossip has it (a)
that new research shows that this figure is much too high, and not
nearly as much water will be needed for extraction of the oil as
was first thought; (b) that since the Reserve nowhere touches the
Colorado River, the water is not "appurtenant," and the claim to
a reserved right may be withdrawn or denied; so that (c) if, or
when, the United States undertakes to develop the oil shale as a
national enterprise or leases of the oil shale are negotiated with
11426 U.S.
"

at 141.

See M. White, supra note 66 at 343, 374.
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oil (energy) companies, the developer must appropriate or buy its
water like any other lessee of oil shale on neighboring BLM lands.
A few years ago the big threat was thought to be that Mineral
King, a huge proposed Walt Disney Inc. ski resort on the Inyo
National Forest in the Sierras, would claim the forest's recreational prerogatives. But the Forest Service has abstained from
assigning its recreation right to concessionaires there and in New
Mexico, and I know of no current threats of this nature. It is
possible, of course, that other types of reservations may take substantial quantities of water. The federal reserved water rights
quantified for the National Wildlife refuges in Arizona v.
California sound big-annual diversions of 41,838 and 28,000
acre-feet producing consumption of 37,339 and 23,000 acre-feet.
But these are drops in the lower Colorado bucket, at most threefourths of one percent of withdrawals, although they admittedly
might loom large elsewhere. Furthermore, a second look at the
facts in the Report of the Special Master shows that these waters
are needed for artificial marshes and irrigated feeding grounds to
be substituted for natural areas destroyed by channelizing the
river; and it is a fair guess that this water is no more than that
which was formerly soaked up by, and evaporated from, the original natural river bottom areas.78 At one time the Fish and Wildlife
Service claimed the full flow of one of the Oregon streams feeding
the Malheur Refuge and demanded that fifty-year-old irrigation
ditches be closed, but that demand has been dropped.
CONCLUSION

I am coming to believe that "the Feds" were right all along.
In 1964, at the height of the debates over the "Western Water
Rights Settlements Acts,"79 it was pointed out that "not a single
case of harm has been reported,"" that "for all of the outcry...
not one state, not one county, not one municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come
forward to plead and prove that the United States . . . has deS. Rifkind, Special Master's Report, Arizona v. California, at 95 (1960).
See note 24 supra.
Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigationand Reclamation of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. 39 (1964) (statement
of Senator Clifford P. Anderson).
"
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stroyed any private right."'" Twenty-two years after Pelton Dam
this is still true.
The actual measurement of National Forest uses in Colorado
shows how small they are, and the quantification of future forest
uses shows that most fears from this source are groundless. Federal officials have refrained from pressing large claims or assigning them to private enterprises carrying out federal functions.
Minimum flows are located for the most part where they can do
the least harm, and the courts are unlikely to order, and the
federal agencies are likely to abstain from enforcing, large instream flows that would force a rollback of longstanding uses that
have done no harm.
I find precious little common ground with Mr. Walter Kiechel and very few things that he and I agree upon. But he puts
forth an idea in a sentence of the supporting statement to the
Kiechel Bill that I think makes sense: "Surely until many more
cases of actual interference are discovered than have been reported so far it is more appropriate that any meritous problems
of this kind which may be found to exist be treated by special
relief legislation.""2 Why not wait? A particularly atrocious case
of uncompensated damage to waterfront property finally brought
the downfall of the navigation servitude in section 111 of the
Flood Control Act of 1970.3 Why not wait for such a case of real
and substantial harm from the implied reservation doctrine?
Maybe Kiechel's special relief bill could be turned into general
legislation. Such a case would be far more effective than the
bogies we have been conjuring up.
So I no longer jump when the old tattered-sheet specter is
thrust at me, and I am tired of leaping into action at every call
of "Wolf!" In the future, I intend to devote my waning energies
to real problems like why the Cappaerts and the United States
do not act like ordinary water users with a protection of diversion
problem, and work out a physical and legal solution that will
allow irrigation, yet preserve the water level and, thus, permit the
Cappaerts and the pupfish each to do their thing.
Id. (statement of Nicolas B. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General).
, See note 46 supra.
" F. TRELEASE, supra note 15, at 189-96.

